In June
2015, I traveled to Moscow to interact with some Russian intellectuals. There
appeared a fair degree of clarity about threats to Russia and the international
community in general; principal among these were from the Islamic State (IS) or
Daesh which appeared to dominate most strategic discussions. Central Asia and
in particular the energy/gas-rich states were considered extremely vulnerable.
The academics were well versed with national and international security issues and they too echoed the perception of the hardcore security specialists. With information flowing in about the Daesh’s entry into Afghanistan there appeared a degree of certainty that the threat would travel northwards because Central Asia offered suitable hunting ground for the spread of radical ideology.
The Russians suspected that the Dagestan and Chechnya militancy would provide the core model and Afghanistan’s clandestine and illegal drug culture would be the financer of this mission. This was the reason why Daesh was so deeply interested in moving into the Afghanistan region.
The Russians in their first truly overseas deployment seem to have come well prepared. Their 10-year-old war in Afghanistan was fought in their front yard. They lost and withdrew due to the proxy war fought by the US through the Mujahideen. This time they seem to be justifying it due to the failure of the US to adequately respond to the threat of Daesh in West Asia, and the inability of the local powers to get their act together. Is that the only cause for this move?
Bashar Assad and his Allawites, to whose rescue the Russians have come, have been the recipients of Russian support for long. Even in the UN Security Council Russia used its veto many times in support of Syria. From a geo-strategic angle Syria is close to the Russian ‘near abroad’ and its access to the Mediterranean through Lattakia offers Russia a toehold in West Asia, after it lost its hold over Egypt during Anwar Sadat’s leadership.
The academics were well versed with national and international security issues and they too echoed the perception of the hardcore security specialists. With information flowing in about the Daesh’s entry into Afghanistan there appeared a degree of certainty that the threat would travel northwards because Central Asia offered suitable hunting ground for the spread of radical ideology.
The Russians suspected that the Dagestan and Chechnya militancy would provide the core model and Afghanistan’s clandestine and illegal drug culture would be the financer of this mission. This was the reason why Daesh was so deeply interested in moving into the Afghanistan region.
The Russians in Lattakia
Three months later, it did not come out as breaking news but crept through online portals just around the time that Vladimir Putin reached New York to address the United Nations General Assembly. The Russians were in North Syria, deployed around the port city of Lattakia where they had harbour facilities. There were multi-role aircraft, drones, tanks and other combat vehicles.The Russians in their first truly overseas deployment seem to have come well prepared. Their 10-year-old war in Afghanistan was fought in their front yard. They lost and withdrew due to the proxy war fought by the US through the Mujahideen. This time they seem to be justifying it due to the failure of the US to adequately respond to the threat of Daesh in West Asia, and the inability of the local powers to get their act together. Is that the only cause for this move?
Bashar Assad and his Allawites, to whose rescue the Russians have come, have been the recipients of Russian support for long. Even in the UN Security Council Russia used its veto many times in support of Syria. From a geo-strategic angle Syria is close to the Russian ‘near abroad’ and its access to the Mediterranean through Lattakia offers Russia a toehold in West Asia, after it lost its hold over Egypt during Anwar Sadat’s leadership.
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